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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOEL H. IZATT, 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
-vs-
MARY C. IZATT, by and through 
her Guardian and Conservator, 
KENNETH G. CLARK, 
Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Case No. 16882 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
The defendant, appellant and cross-respondent, Mary 
C. Izatt, by and through her guardian and conservator, Kenneth 
G. Clark, hereby submits this Reply Brief in response to the 
Brief of the respondent and cross-appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE MENTAL CRUELTY AS REQUIRED 
BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 30-3-1. 
The plaintiff goes to great length in its brief to 
describe the health of the plaintiff and to point out that the 
plaintiff adversely reacted to the pressures and demands of 
living with and caring for the defendant. These reactions are 
the result of the plaintiff's own mental and physical capabilities. 
To assert that the plaintiff is entitled to a divorce because 
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of his reaction to the pressures and demands of life is 
inconsistent with the requirements of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 30-3-1 that a party be entitled to a divorce when he 
or she has been treated in a mentally cruel manner. The 
plaintiff agreed to accept these pressures and demands when he 
married the defendant. 
As cited in the plaintiff's and the defendant's 
briefs, Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Ut.147, 152 P.2d 426 (1944) 
established that a physical condition does not in and of 
itself constitute mental cruelty. In Johnson the court found 
other actions (beating one of the children over the head, 
abusing his wife, using abusive names in the presence of the 
children and accusing his wife of being unfaithful in the 
presence of the children) which constituted mental cruelty. 
However, these acts of mental cruelty were not caused by the 
~hysicial condition and constituted independent actions. 
In the present situation, the plaintiff himself 
described the marriage of the parties as an "ideal" marriage 
prior to the time of the defendant's surgery. Thereafter, the 
defendantts shortcomings or inabilities to deal with her 
family resulted directly from this condition. Dr. Paul H. 
Wender testified that the defendant's problems (impaired 
memory, impaired social judgment, impaired recall of emotional 
responsibilities to her husband and to her children) resulted 
from the brain damage. Therefore, the defendant did not treat 
the plaintiff in a mentally cruel manner because of her condition 
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and committed no independent acts which constituted mental 
cruelty. 
The plaintiff places considerable em~hasis on the 
fact that the defendant attended the divorce trial and testified. 
From this attendance and testimony, the plaintiff asserts that 
the defendant was culpable for her actions towards the plaintiff. 
It has never been asserted nor is it the case that the defendant 
does not know right from wrong nor that she is unable to converse 
with others. Certainly, the defendant was entitled to attend 
the trial which controlled her future destiny and had the right 
to attempt to defend herself from the claims of the plaintiff. 
This does no establish that the defendant's actions toward the 
plaintiff and her children were not the result of brain damage. 
The testimony of Dr. Wender, called to testify for the plaintiff, 
does state the cause of the defendant's actions to be the 
result of the brain damage. 
The plaintiff's description of the defendant's testimony 
mistates the defendant's ability to state her position. The 
defendant came under a great deal of stress during her testimony 
and the line of questioning dealing directly with the family sit-
uation, the treatment she had received from her husband and. 
the grounds for divorce were cut short. The following excerpts 
from the record indicate the difficulties faced by the defendant: 
Q (by Mr. Hans on) : 
A(by Mrs. Izatt): 
Q: 
Are you alright? 
Yes. 
Would you like a drink of water 
or anything? 
-3-
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A: 
* 
Q: 
A: 
No, I will be alright. (T 506) 
* * 
Now, we will get to a stress 
point here. I don't like to 
see you in distress. Are you 
alright now? 
I think so. (T 50 7) 
At this point, Mr. Hanson brought a drink of water to 
Mrs. Izatt. No further questioning was pursued with regard to 
the grounds for divorce and the relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant should not, of 
course, be penalized because of her inability to continue to 
discuss this relationship. 
POINT II 
THE AMOUNTS RECEIVED AS COMPENSATION FOR THE 
DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL INJURIES ARE THE SEPARATE 
PROPERTY OF THE DEFENDANT. THESE AMOUNTS 
ARE IN LARGE PART COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES 
WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS AND WILL FACE 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE DIVORCE. 
Utah Code Annotated Section.30-2-1 et. seq. outlines 
the property rights of women. Section 30-2-1 states: 
Real and personal estate of every female 
acquired before marriage, and all nroperty to 
which she may afterwards become entitled by 
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance, bequest or 
devise, shall be and remain the estate and property 
of such fem~le, and shall not be liable for the 
debts, obligations or engagements of her husband 
and may be conveyed, devised or bequeathed by 
her as if she were unmarried. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-2-4 denies a husband any 
recovery for personal wrong to a married woman. As pertinent 
to actions for personal injury, this statute states: 
-4-
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... there shall be no right of recovery by the husband 
on account of personal injury or wrong to his 
wife, or for expenses connected therewith, but the 
wife may recover against a third person for such 
injury or wrong as if unmarried, and such recovery 
shall include expenses of medical treatment and 
other expenses paid or assumed by the husband. 
(Emphasis added) 
In C6rbridge v. M. Mo~riri & Son, Inc., 19 Ut.2d 409, 
432 P.Zd 41 (1967), the plaintiff's husband brought an action 
for expenses incurred in providing care for his family while 
his wife recovered from injuries sustained in a fall. This 
court upheld that trial court's grant of a summary judgment 
which disallowed recovery to the husband for personal injuries 
sustained by the wife. 
In W.W. Clyde & . Comp.any v.· Dyess, 126 F. 2d 719 
(10th Circuit 1972), the plaintiff, a married woman, sued the 
defendant to recover for personal injuries allegedly incurred 
in an automobile accident. The Tenth Circuit, applying Utah 
law, construed the predecessor to Utah Code Annotated Section 
30-2-4 as follows: 
... more than that, the material part of 
Section 40-2-4·, Revise·d Statutes of Utah 1933 
(the predecessor of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 30-2-4), provides in substance that the 
husband shall have no right of recovery for 
personal injuries to the wife, that she may 
recover for such injuries as though she were 
unmarried and that the recovery shall include 
medical and other expenses paid or assumed by 
the husband ... We think the statute, when 
fairly construed, embraces both substantive 
and remedial elements. It strips the husband 
of any right of recovery for personal injuries 
by the wife arising out of the tort of a third 
person, and it vests in her the right to 
-5-
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recovery for such a wrong as though she were an 
unmarried woman. It places a married woman on 
equal footing with an-unmarried woman in respect 
to redress for personal injuries occurring out 
of a tort. It empowers a married woman to 
maintain in her own name a suit to recover 
for such injuries and it vests in her recovery 
therefor to the same extent and for all purposes 
as through she were a single woman. 126 F.2d at 
722. 
The Utah law clearly provides that the funds received 
in settlement of the malpractice action belong to the defendant. 
The plaintiff should not receive directly or indirectly (by 
requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff's parents) the 
settlement assets. The law, in attempting to equate the rights 
of married and unmarried woman, is applicable here since the 
defendant now faces the future as an unmarried woman. 
The vague assertions in the plaintiff's brief that 
payments on loans to various banks or to his parents were for 
medical bills are not supported by the record and do not sub-
stantiate that the plaintiff actually incurred any medical expenses 
on behalf of the defendant. The plaintiff further failed to 
provide the court with evidence of payments made or reimbursements 
from insurance companies for the medical expenses of the defendant. 
Therefore, the plaintiff nor his parents should receive any 
portions, directly or indirectly, of the settlement assets. 
A major part of the personal injury settlement is 
compensation for losses the defendant has and will incur subseque~ 
to the divorce. Her abilities to function have been impaired, 
her family has been broken up and she will require continued 
-6-
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supervision and medical treatment. She will need and will use 
the settlement assets to provide for her own needs throughout 
the remainder of her life. The trial court obviously considered 
this in awarding the defendant, who has a right to be supported 
by her husband, only $1.00 per year in alimony. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5, the 
trial court provided to the defendant's guardian and conservator, 
Kenneth G. Clark, $15,000 to meet the defendant's current needs. 
The court ordered that the additional money be invested in 
government insured investments. This money is now invested in 
government insured money market certificates. However, the 
plaintiff now asserts that the interest on this money market 
certificate is an asset to be divided by the court. This income 
relates to investments made pursuant to the court order of 
monies already granted to and properly belonging to the defendant 
to which the plaintiff has no claim. Further~ this interest is 
and will be necessary to meet the living expenses of the defendant. 
At trial, the cost of institutional care for the defendant was 
established at approximately $1,125 per month. (T 487) While 
the defendant has spent the summer with her parents outside the 
Plantation Convalescent Center, there is no way of knowing when 
and for how long she may require full-time convalescent center 
care during the remainder of her life. The defendant through her 
guardian and conservator, is attempting to provide for her own 
needs and to allow the plaintiff to do likewise. However, 
claims by the plaintiff to the income or principal of the settlement 
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assets do not allow the defendant to do so. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A LIEN 
EQUAL TO 1/2 OF THE EQUITY IN THE 
HOME. THIS LIEN DOES NOT INTERFERE 
WITH THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS. 
The plaintiff asserts that the defendant is not entitled 
to any lien in the home because this lien infringes upon the 
defendant's rights to move from the home and the defendant's 
obligations to his family. To the contrary, however, the defendaru 
is not infringing on any of the plaintiff's rights and is materiall 
contributing to the needs of the children. 
The defendant served faithfully (in an "ideal" marriage) 
as the plaintiff's wife for 16 years. She is the mother of the 
parties' four children. The defendant has attempted to assist 
her family and not stand in the way of the plaintiff's building 
of a new life which he believes he must have. 
The defendant has taken significant steps to assist 
her family and nqt interfere with the plaintiff's activities. 
The defendant stipulated to a modification of the original 
Decree of Divorce so that th~ plaintiff could remain in the home 
and not be forced to pay the defendant for her interest in the 
home because of the plaintiff's remarriage. The defendant is not 
seeking a review of the $1.00 per year alimony award even though 
the plaintiff has a recognized duty to support the defendant. 
The defendant is paying for tounseling for her children. These 
actions do not infringe on the plaintiff's rights. 
The defendant is asking for a non-interest bearing 
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lien for 1/2 of the equity in the parties' home as of the time 
of trial. This lien is not payable until the parties' minor 
children reach majority; the house is sold; or the house is not 
used as a home for the children. The defendant is allowing the 
plaintiff, his new wife, her children, his new wife's children 
and perhaps the plaintiff and his new wife's children to live 
in the home. The defendant will not receive any increase in 
the value of the home after the time of the divorce. Part of 
this increase would, of course, be attributable to the defendant's 
share of the home. 
The plaintiff further asserts that he faces financial 
obligations he cannot meet and that the defendant's interest in 
the home interferes with his ability to meet his obligations. 
This assertion fails to recogni~e that the defendant is entitled 
to an equitable portion of the marital estate and that the 
plaintiff has no continuing obligations to the defendant (except 
for $1.00 per year alimony). The plaintiff has had and may 
continue to have the benefit of his new wife's income in meeting 
his obligations. Further~ the parties' children will soon 
start reaching majority so that plaintiff's obligations to the 
children will be reduced and eventually eliminated. 
Under the circumstances, it seems the defendant is 
entitled to receive a lien for 1/2 of the equity in the parties' 
home~ 
-9-
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POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF'S PARENTS ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY AMOUNTS 
FROM THE DEFENDANT. 
The plaintiff attempts to place upon the defendant a 
procedural burden of raising the statute of limitations as an 
affirmative defense to the plaintiff's claims for the alleged 
debts owed to his father. The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
(T 17-19) makes no mention of the existence of or elements of 
the parents' claim. Therefore, the defendant cannot be required 
to raise an affirmative defense to a claim of which she had no 
notice of. 
The plaintiff's responses to the defendant's 
challenge of the plaintiff's parents' claims are contrary to 
the law and the evidence. The plaintiff's father testified 
that he made advances to the family out of a moral obligation 
(not a desire to collect) which he·felt to his son because he 
was the plaintiff's father. This moral obligation is not 
enforceable against the defendant. 
The plaintiff cites In Re ·c1over' s Estate, 237 P. 2d 
391 (Kan. 1951) for the proposition that a promise to pay 
when one is able does not have 'the statute of limitations run 
against the claim until the party is shown to be able to pay 
the indebtedness. O'Hair v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d 799 (Ut. 1970) 
establishes contrary Utah law. I~ D'Hair, the plaintiff, 
following her eighteenth birthday, lived next door to the 
-10-
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defendant's family. The defendant's family was the closest 
thing the plaintiff had to a real family after the plaintiff 
was orphaned at age 14. The defendant, following his brother's 
arrest for violations of Federal law, asked to borrow money 
~ to pay legal fees. The plaintiff asserted that there was an 
oral loan agreement to be repaid in about five (5) years. 
The defendants raised the defense of the four year statute of 
limitations of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-25(1). In 
ili determining when the statute of limitations began to run, the 
~·• court stated: 
In Grayson v.Crawford, 189 Okla. 546, 119 P.Zd 42 
(1941) the court stated that a reasonable time for 
performance is allowed, when the evidence indicates 
that the cause of action did not accrue at the time 
the money was loaned, and the parties although they 
did not fix a definite date, intended that payment 
was to be made at a future time. Under such circum-
stances, the statute of limitations does not begin 
to run until a reasonable time has elapsed. What 
is a reasonable time is a question to be determined 
from consideration of all the facts and circum-
stances in the case in which the question arises ... 
463 P~Zd at 800-801. 
Under the present circumstances, the plaintiff's 
u father advanced money to the plaintiff without determining 
whether the plaintiff was able to repay the money or without 
determining when the plaintiff would be in a position to 
return the money9 The plaintiff, at the time of all or part 
of the advances, was fully employed; and had and was receiving 
assistance from the L.n.s·. church. Therefore, there is no 
reason why the plaintiff could not repay these amounts to his 
-11-
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father at the time they were incurred. Therefore, the debt 
became due and payable at the time of the advance and the 
statute of limitations has run against the obligations. 
The problems with the plaintiff's narents' claim 
are further exemplified by the assertion of this claim by 
the plaintiff rather than the parents themselves. The plaintiff's 
parents' claim should be required to stand or fall on its own 
merits rather than being asserted by the nlaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant does not dispute that under the 
circumstances where the plaintiff had placed the defendant in 
the Plantation Convalescent Center and had brought an action 
for a divorce against the defendant that the court had little 
choice but to grant a divorce. This does not mean that the 
plaintiff was not required to show th~t the defendant treated 
him in a mentally cruel manner in order to be entitled to 
have a divorce granted to him. The plaintiff has failed to 
meet the requirements of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-1 
and~ therefore, the plaintiff should not be entitled to a 
divorce from the defendant. 
The defendant is entitled to the proceeds from the 
personal injury settlement. The principal and income on this 
amount is and will be required by the defendant to meet her 
living expenses in future years. Any claims to the contrary 
by the plaintiff are without merit and are contradictory to 
-12-
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the obligation of the plaintiff to provide for his wife. 
The defendant is equitably entitled to a lien for 
1/2 of the equity at the time of trial in the parties' home. 
Granting such a lien to the defendant does not violate any of 
the plaintiff's rights nor does it hinder his ability to provide 
for his family. To the contrary, the terms of the lien (no 
interest and payable only on resale, adulthood of the minor 
~ children or if the property is no longer used as a home for the 
minor children) constitutes a direct contribution by the defendant 
to the economic needs of the defendant's children. Further, the 
assets which the defendant will ultimately receive as a 
l result of this lien will likely be required to meet the 
living requirements of the defendant in the future. 
The plaintiff's parents are not entitled to any recovery 
of any amount of the personal injury settlement. The claim of the 
~ parents is not a valid obligation of the defendant. Therefore, 
the defendant should not be ~esponsible for any portion of 
the alleged debt to the plaintiff's parents. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this·. " day of December, 
NSON & DUNN 
X . H SON 
T OTHY R. NSON 
650 ClarkLea ·ng Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent Mary C. Izatt 
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